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decision on the fact that the event was unexpected at the close of the
taxpayer's tax year.
In summary then, it would appear that when a taxpayer on the
accrual basis has correctly accrued an item according to recognized
accounting procedures and has filed its return on that basis, it need
not readjust that return to account for changes due to events occurring
after the close of its fiscal year unless it could reasonably anticipate
those events occurring within a reasonable time after the close of its
fiscal year. In cases where an event can reasonably be anticipated,
the taxpayer must hold his books open for a reasonable time in order
to readjust, or else it will be required to reopen its books, if already
closed, to adjust for the change.
The principal case extends this rule so as to allow an accrual taxpayer who has correctly accrued an item and closed its books but has
not yet filed its tax return, to go ahead and file its tax returns on that
basis even though an event has occurred after the close of its fiscal
year which changes its tax liability; providing the event could not
reasonably have been anticipated and it would be unreasonable to require the taxpayer to reopen its books for the past year and readjust
them.
In these cases the proper procedure is to adjust for the change
on the next year's return. However, if an item is incorrectly accrued
the proper procedure is to go back to the year in which the mistake
was made and file an amended return for that year.14 The theory
being: an erroneous reporting of income because of a mistake in a
prior year does not authorize an erroneous reporting in a subsequent
year in order to adjust for the prior mistake.15
ROBERT WATSON

Defenses To A Charge of Offering Services and Facilities To
Customers in Violation of The Robinson-Patman Act-Petitioner,
a corporation, was charged by the FTC with violation of Sec. 2 (e)
of the Robinson-Patman Act' in that it gave services and facilities to
customers on a discriminatory basis (other than a "proportionally
equal" basis). Petitioner sells patterns for women's dresses. Its principal customers are of two types: "fabric" shops and "Red Front"
stores. The "fabric" shops sell materials as their principal commodity
and offer patterns to their customers primarly as a service. Many make
14
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§13 (1952).

1958]

RECENT DECISIONS

no profit from the sale of such patterns and their volume is relatively
small. "Red Front" stores sell patterns in bulk for a profit, usually
handling no other commodity.
The findings of fact indicate that catalogues which depict patterns
are essential to the business of selling patterns. Such catalogues were
furnished free of charge to the "Red Front" stores. The "fabric"
shops, however, were required to buy the same catalogues at a charge
of $1.65 to $2.00 per copy. Cabinets for the storing of catalogues and
patterns were likewise furnished free of charge to "Red Front" stores,
but the "fabric" shops were required to pay rental for the more
elaborate cabinets which their business required.
Petitioner offered evidence of "cost justification" for its discriminatory practices. The FTC refused to allow such evidence on the
grounds "cost justification" was not a defense to a charge of violation
of Sec. 2 (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Held: The FTC erred in excluding evidence of "cost justification".
Section 2(b) of the Act2 provides for "justification" as a defense to
a Sec. 2(e) charge and this "justification" includes "cost justification".
Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 26 L.W.
2613, CCH TRADE REG. REP. para. 69,047 (D.C. Cir. May 1958).
Sec. 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act 3 provides that no seller
shall give services or facilities to customers on other than "proportionally equal terms". It has been held that a tendency to create a
monopoly or adversely effect competition is not essential to a violation
of 2(e) in that the section does not so provide and thus a showing of
mere discrimination is adequate to support a cause of action. 4 Likewise, it has been held that the defenses to a charge of price discrimination which are contained in Sec. 2(a) 5 are not to be read into Sec. 2(e).6
Thus the only valid defenses to a charge of violation of this section
are set forth in Sec. 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act which provides:
"(b) Upon proof being made . . . that there has been discrimination in price or services of facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing
justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation
of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively
shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing herein
contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case
thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of
services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made
249 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S. C. §13 (1952).

3 See note 1 supra.
4Corn Products Refining Co. vs. F.T.C., 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
549 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S. C. §13 (1952).
6 Elizabeth Arden Inc. vs. F.T.C., 156 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
331 U.S.806 (1947).
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in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or
the services or facilities furnished by a competitor."
It has been generally believed that the above section, when applied
to a 2(c) violation, merely establishes the defense that the discrimination was done in good faith to meet competition. However, in the
instant case the court has indicated that other defenses are possible
under Sec. 2(b). The court states:
"Congress certainly never wrote 2(b) with its varying facets
only to have the entire section conditioned to situations arising
under the proviso. Congress, we think, must have intended that
the justification to be shown under the first clause of 2(b) as to
a 2(e) charge of discrimination in facilities furnished to various
customers, was to depend upon the facts in a particular case.
That the term may include cost justification . . . seems clear

enough."
Thus it would seem there is no specific delineation as to what
constitutes "justification" but each case must be decided on its own
merits. Clearly, "cost justification" in some instances, will be a valid
defense. One charged with service and facility discrimination should
not consider "cost justification" as a panacea, however, as it has been
etremely difficult to show "cost justification" for price discrimination
under Sec. 2(a) and there is nothing to indicate it will be any easier
,o prove such justification for service and facility discrimination.
It is interesting to speculate what other defenses may be raised as
"justification" to a charge of facility discrimination. Perhaps the fact
that the discrimination could not possibly effect competition might be
a defense under the appropriate facts. It seems that amplification on
what constitutes justification will only come through judicial interpretation as varying defenses are raised on varying facts.
It is likewise interesting to note that Sec. 2(b) refers to price discrimination as well as service and facility discrimination. Thus, perhaps defenses other than those set forth in Sec. 2(a) and the proviso
of Sec. 2(b) are possible to a price discrimination charge. The court
in the instant case does not mention this possiblity but it is not beyond
the realm of logical inference.
GEORGE J. MALY, JR.

C.C.H. TRADE REG. REP. para. 69,047, at para. 74,133.

